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European countries have become more and
more integrated in recent decades. Now, Euro-
peans routinely sell goods and services across
national boundaries, own stocks and bonds
from other countries, and work abroad. But
since each country has its own currency, Euro-
peans spend a lot of time and resources trad-
ing one currency for another.
To make their financial lives easier, 11 Euro-
pean countries are joining together to form the
European Monetary Union (EMU), which will
have only one currency, the euro.1 A common
currency will not only save these countries time
and money, but it will also increase trade within
Europe as well as make it easier for citizens of
one country to buy stocks and bonds in another.
However, monetary union also has costs. Eu-
ropean countries can now adjust their ex-
change-rate and monetary policies in response
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to severe domestic economic problems. Although
the introduction of a single currency will sim-
plify trade between European countries, each
country will give up the ability to use monetary
policy to influence its economy. No individual
country’s central bank will be able to set interest
rates. And no country in the EMU will be able to
adjust its exchange rate vis à vis the others.
How large a sacrifice will it be to give up in-
dependent monetary and exchange-rate poli-
cies? The answer depends on the types of mac-
roeconomic “shocks” that hit the economy and
how well other adjustment mechanisms com-
pensate for the lack of exchange-rate flexibil-
ity. In particular, it will depend on the degree
to which prices and wages adjust to accommo-
date those shocks, the degree to which labor
can move across borders, and the extent to
which fiscal policy can be used to control the
economy.
BENEFITS OF A SINGLE CURRENCY
The move to a single currency has many po-
tential benefits. As noted above, reducing the
costs of trading one currency for another is the
most important. A single currency also helps
nations in a number of other ways, such as re-
ducing uncertainty about future exchange rates
and preventing countries from devaluing their
currencies to promote exports.
Reducing Costs of Exchange. When an im-
porter pays for goods, domestic currency must
be exchanged for foreign currency at a bank.
The bank will demand a service charge for this
transaction. For firms that import many sup-
plies or that export to many countries, such
transaction costs may be sizable and will partly
be passed on to consumers through higher
prices.  These transaction costs are estimated
to be roughly 0.4 percent of the gross domestic
product of potential members of the European
Monetary Union.2
Reducing Exchange-Rate Uncertainty. Al-
though many countries now operate with a flex-
ible exchange-rate system, the countries prepar-
ing for monetary union have already limited
how much their currencies move with respect
to each other. Each country stabilizes the ex-
change rates between its currency and the other
10, and the exchange rates of all move jointly
relative to other currencies in the world.
Policymakers can make large adjustments in the
rate at which one European currency is ex-
changed for another only when economic cir-
cumstances in one country change a great deal
relative to circumstances in the others.
Though large adjustments are infrequent, the
current system allows a fair amount of day-to-
day volatility in exchange rates. The resulting
uncertainty about the future value of a currency
poses a risk for importers and exporters. Imag-
ine a French manufacturer contracting to ex-
port a certain amount of equipment to Italy six
months from now. A price will be agreed upon
today, payable in six months in French francs.
If the cost of French francs in terms of lira rises
during that period, the Italian importer will find
herself paying more for the equipment than she
had originally intended. Exchange-rate risk is,
of course, associated only with international
trade, so the Italian importer may prefer a lo-
cal producer even if the French producer is cur-
rently less expensive. Although an importer or
exporter can hedge against possible changes in
the exchange rate by using forward or futures
contracts, this activity is costly.
Thus, exchange-rate risk reduces trade by
imposing a hidden cost on the transaction. A
single currency eliminates all exchange-rate risk
between the countries in the EMU and there-
fore increases trade and the benefits associated
with it. These benefits include a greater vari-
ety of products and lower prices due to com-
petition and economies of scale from produc-
ing for a larger market. In fact, many econo-
mists believe that one of the greatest benefits
of a single currency comes from its favorable
2See the article by the European Commission.Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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effect on trade from increased competition.
Preventing Competitive Devaluations. Be-
tween world wars I and II, European countries
engaged in what are known as competitive de-
valuations: one country would devalue its cur-
rency to boost its export sector, and its trading
partners would retaliate by devaluing their cur-
rencies as well. Reducing the value of currency
is inflationary, so competitive devaluations
caused an inflationary spiral during that pe-
riod. Although the current European exchange-
rate arrangement is designed to limit the threat
of competitive devaluations, such devaluations
remain possible so long as there are multiple
currencies whose exchange rates are set by
policymakers, rather than determined by the
market as in a floating exchange-rate system.
As trade between European countries has in-
creased, the costs to one’s trading partners from
using a competitive devaluation have increased
but so have the potential gains to any one coun-
try. However, the effect of competitive devalu-
ations on the world’s economic welfare is
clearly negative, and it can be disastrous if re-
taliation leads to a devaluation spiral. A single
currency eliminates the threat of this type of
competition.
Preventing Speculative Attacks. Because it
allows large, though infrequent, exchange-rate
adjustments, the current European exchange-
rate mechanism is vulnerable to speculative at-
tacks: if speculators believe the value of a cur-
rency will be reduced (devalued relative to
other European currencies), they will sell their
holdings. If enough speculators believe this,
confidence in the value of the currency may
collapse and may force the government to de-
value even if that had never been its intent.
Although a government can try to thwart
speculators by raising interest rates and thereby
the return to holding money-market instru-
ments denominated in that currency, there’s a
downside to doing so: higher interest rates
mean that business firms face higher borrow-
ing costs, so they’ll do less borrowing and in-
vesting in new plant and equipment, which, in
turn, will lead to slower economic growth.
The exchange-rate crisis of 1992 illustrates
the effect of speculative attacks on the economy.
Europe at that time had been in a deep reces-
sion for two full years; the average European
unemployment rate was approximately 10 per-
cent. Short-term political pressures in the coun-
tries most badly hit by the recession argued for
a low-interest-rate policy to stimulate invest-
ment and bring about recovery. But such a
policy would be inconsistent with maintaining
stable exchange rates unless the policy were
pursued across all of Europe. If only one coun-
try were to lower its interest rates, financial
capital would move out of that country to ones
that still had high rates (so long as capital is
free to move, as in Europe). This movement of
capital would put pressure on exchange rates.
However, although this recession affected all
of Europe, there was no unanimity as to the ap-
propriate interest-rate policy to pursue. The
German government and central bank felt that
they had already excessively stimulated the
German economy in an attempt to help the
former East Germany catch up with the West.
Those policies, they believed, were already put-
ting inflationary pressure on the economy.3 To
offset those inflationary pressures, Germany
was pursuing a high interest-rate policy. Be-
cause of Germany’s relative size and economic
importance in Europe, the other European
countries were forced to raise their rates as well
if they wanted to maintain stable exchange
rates. All committed to doing so, but this com-
mitment was not credible in the eyes of cur-
rency speculators. Speculators began to bet that
at least three countries—the U.K., France, and
Italy—would succumb to domestic political
pressures and deviate from Germany’s interest
rate policy.
In September 1992 speculators began to bor-
3See the report by the Bundesbank.
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row British pounds, French francs, and Italian
lira and to convert the proceeds into German
marks and U.S. dollars because they expected
the price of pounds, francs, and lira to fall after
the governments abandoned their commitment
to keep interest rates as high as necessary to
maintain a stable exchange rate. As more and
more speculators sold these currencies, their
value in terms of German marks continued to
fall. In an attempt to attract buyers to their cur-
rencies, the British, French, and Italian govern-
ments offered very high rates of return on short-
term instruments denominated in their home
currencies. A side-effect of this policy was a
deepened recession in those countries, which
made adherence to fixed exchange rates in-
creasingly unpopular. That unpopularity, in
turn, increased speculation that the policy of
fixed exchange rates would not be sustainable.
Of the three, only France was able to success-
fully ward off the speculative attack. Both Brit-
ain and Italy abandoned their fixed exchange
rates as a result of the speculative pressures.
Although France “survived” the speculative
attack on its exchange rate, survival was costly
in the sense that the high interest rates and in-
creased uncertainty prolonged high unemploy-
ment and low growth in that country. Britain
and Italy recovered from the recession more
quickly because lower interest rates and depre-
ciation of their currencies stimulated domestic
spending and exports. But there were costs to
Britain and Italy as well; however, these costs
came later, when inflation rose as a result of
the devaluations.
Since much of the speculative activity within
Europe has occurred when speculators have bet
that one European currency would be deval-
ued relative to another, moving to a single cur-
rency would eliminate such activity. And since
investors will not have to be compensated for
uncertainty about exchange rates, interest rates
will fall, thereby stimulating investment and
growth within the EMU. Although interest rates
will fall more in those countries that are now
subject to the most speculation, many econo-
mists think that all countries will benefit from
lower rates as the world economic environment
becomes less risky.
COSTS OF A SINGLE CURRENCY
The benefits of switching to a single currency
don’t come without costs. Probably the biggest
cost is that each country cedes its right to set
monetary policy to respond to domestic eco-
nomic problems. In addition, exchange rates be-
tween countries can no longer adjust in re-
sponse to regional problems.
As a practical matter, the costs associated
with giving up the possibility of independent
monetary policy may be small for most Euro-
pean countries. As part of their effort to stimu-
late trade and investment, potential EMU mem-
bers have eliminated all barriers to international
capital flows, which has created a very com-
petitive multi-country financial market. Con-
sequently, there is little or no difference in the
cost of borrowing (the interest rate) in the dif-
ferent countries so long as exchange rates be-
tween European currencies are kept fairly
stable. This European interest rate is deter-
mined by the large European countries, imply-
ing that small countries in the European Union
do not have the ability to lower interest rates
during recessions unless they are willing to see
their currencies devalued. In other words, Eu-
ropean financial and exchange-rate treaties
have left small member countries effectively
without the ability to conduct independent
monetary policy. But all member countries will
have representation in monetary policy deci-
sions after monetary union. The EMU will give
small countries some influence in determining
the European interest rate even as it formally
eliminates the possibility of using independent
monetary policy and exchange-rate adjust-
ments.
The EMU member countries have also
agreed to limit the use of fiscal policies. Conse-
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the currency union, but not all, face recession
or an overheated economy, adjustment must
occur largely through changes in wages and
prices or through the movement of workers
from one country to another.
Monetary Policy. The biggest change in
moving to a single currency is that each coun-
try will relinquish control over monetary policy
to the new European central bank that will is-
sue the single currency for all the countries in
the union. But what happens if a recession hits
just one country? Currently, its central bank
may respond to the recession by increasing the
money supply, thereby pushing interest rates
downward and stimulating investment and
economic recovery. The central bank for the
European Monetary Union will be unlikely to
use expansionary monetary policy to help one
country, since doing so would cause inflation
in those EMU countries not in recession.
To illustrate the consequences of having a
single currency when there are disparate re-
gional interests, let’s consider a scenario in
which Europe already had a single currency in
1992.
A single European currency in 1992. What
would have happened had there been a single
European currency at the time of German re-
unification and the 1990-92 recession if a Euro-
pean central bank had raised interest rates as
the German central bank did? Consider first the
implications for Britain and Italy: Britain and
Italy devalued their currencies and lowered
interest rates to stimulate exports and invest-
ment, allowing them to recover more quickly
from recession but at the eventual cost of infla-
tion. If they had been members of a currency
union following Germany’s interest-rate policy,
they would not have been able to devalue, nor
would they have been able to lower interest
rates to stimulate investment for a quicker re-
covery. Thus, Germany would have combated
its inflation through the high-interest-rate
policy of the currency union, but Britain and
Italy would have had prolonged recessions.
In lieu of reducing interest rates and devalu-
ing their currencies, Britain and Italy might
have used fiscal policy to stimulate their econo-
mies.  Both nations could have cut taxes or in-
creased public investment to stimulate aggre-
gate demand during the recession, but such
actions would have increased budget deficits
and required additional government borrow-
ing.  Large and persistent government borrow-
ing by one or more countries could impose costs
on all countries in the monetary union by put-
ting upward pressure on interest rates or by
forcing the European central bank to increase
the money supply to avoid higher interest rates,
thus risking higher inflation. Therefore, Euro-
pean governments have agreed that none of the
countries participating in the EMU will allow
its yearly budget deficit to exceed 3 percent of
its GDP.  Moreover, participating countries have
agreed that any country whose budget deficit
exceeds that cap will pay substantial penalties
to the others.  These agreements prevent coun-
tries from issuing excessive amounts of gov-
ernment debt over the long run, but they also
seem likely to restrict each country’s ability to
use stimulative fiscal policy during recessions.
These agreements do not, however, prevent
using a federal fiscal policy to address regional
imbalances in the currency union: those regions
that are overheating could be taxed more
heavily and the proceeds spent in the areas in
recession.  In the example above, policymakers
in 1992 might have cooled inflationary pres-
sures in the western part of Germany by rais-
ing taxes there and might have stimulated re-
covery in Britain, Italy, and France by spend-
ing the extra tax revenue on public investment
in those countries. Currently, the federal bud-
get for the European Union is not used as a tool
to address recessions or overheating, either in
particular countries or in Europe as a whole.
Of course, if economic adjustment from re-
cessions happens quickly, there is very little cost
associated with giving up interest- or exchange-
rate policy and no need for federal redistribu-
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tion. The speed of recovery depends greatly on
the flexibility of the European labor market. If
workers are highly mobile, British and Italian
workers who are unemployed or earning low
wages during the recession will quickly relo-
cate to Germany or other countries that have a
high demand for labor. This type of flexibility
has an equalizing effect across the monetary
union and makes for greater symmetry in
policy objectives. In Europe, however, cultural
and linguistic differences hinder labor move-
ments across countries, so this particular type
of labor-market flexibility is not promising in
the near future.
A second form of labor market flexibility oc-
curs through wage adjustments. If, in a reces-
sion, workers are willing to accept lower wages,
employers will not only be able to maintain the
same number of employees but also to pass on
the reduction in payroll costs in the form of
lower prices. Lower prices, in turn, spur exports
and lead domestic consumers to buy fewer
imports and more locally made goods. That
increase in demand spurs economic recovery.
In practice, however, although wages seem to
go up during booms, they do not fall so readily
during recessions.
Thus, given that budget deficits in Italy and
Britain in 1992 were already at or above 3 per-
cent of GDP and that European labor markets
are fairly inflexible, recovery in those two coun-
tries would have been much slower had they
been members of a monetary union that fol-
lowed Germany’s high-interest-rate policy.
France, however, might have experienced a
quicker recovery under monetary union be-
cause French policymakers, determined to pre-
vent devaluation of the franc and the resulting
inflation, responded to the speculative attack
by raising interest rates even more than Ger-
many had. Thus, monetary union would have
imposed no additional burden on the French
economy, and moreover, it would not have suf-
fered the destabilizing consequences of foreign-
exchange speculation. Thus, it is important to
understand not only how regions differ in terms
of their position in the business cycle but also
cultural preferences and differences in
policymakers’ goals.
The 1990-91 recession: The U.S. experience. The
United States also suffered a recession during
the 1990-91 period. Although the recession was
less severe in the United States than in Europe,
the United States experienced regional differ-
ences in the severity and length of the down-
turn. The recession came as federal military ex-
penditures were being cut back, and regions
such as southern California, which had a heavy
concentration of defense contractors and mili-
tary bases, were particularly hard hit. Conse-
quently, unemployment in California was
higher than in the rest of the country; by 1993,
U.S. unemployment was only 6.5 percent while
in California unemployment stood at 8.6 per-
cent.
The federal tax and transfer system aided
unemployed Californians through unemploy-
ment benefits. The federal government also
aided the region by subsidizing conversion of
military bases to commercial use, the revenues
for which came from more prosperous regions
of the country. Labor-market flexibility also con-
tributed to eventual recovery as workers mi-
grated from California to neighboring states.
Although direct evidence of worker migration
is hard to come by, one careful study indicates
that there was a net immigration of about
200,000 people from other states to California
from mid-1989 to mid-1990 (just before the re-
cession began) and a net out-migration of more
than 250,000 people from mid-1993 to mid-
1994.4 That out-migration was just under 1 per-
cent of California’s population. The outflow of
the labor force, of course, put competitive
downward pressure on wages in neighboring
states, another painful part of the adjustment
process.5
The relatively deep California recession also
4See the study by Hans Johnson and Richard Lovelady.Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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hurt neighboring states by reducing their firms’
sales to Californians, which resulted in further
job losses, most especially in Arizona, Nevada,
and Hawaii. Thus, the flexibility of the labor
market helped bring about recovery in Califor-
nia, but at the expense of exporting recession
and unemployment to the rest of the region. In
this particular example, fiscal transfers, sus-
tained demand for the non-military goods sold
to other states, and the availability of jobs in
neighboring states lessened California’s pain.
However, in spite of these means of adjustment,
which are necessary in a monetary union such
as the United States, the relatively high unem-
ployment that remained in California in 1993
demonstrated that the adjustment process in the
United States is still a difficult one despite the
country’s relatively high labor-market flexibil-
ity and large fiscal budget.
REDUCING THE COSTS AND
PRESERVING THE BENEFITS
The examples above show that the keys to a
currency union’s ability to adjust to economic
shocks are the degree to which wages and prices
are flexible and the ease with which labor
moves across borders. So how is Europe likely
to fare?
European Labor Markets Are Inflexible. Al-
though labor-market flexibility can substitute
for a policy response, labor-market flexibility
in Europe is clearly much lower than that in
the United States.6 Compared with their U.S.
counterparts, European workers are much more
willing to remain unemployed rather than ac-
cept lower wages. They are also much less will-
ing to move out of regions with high unem-
ployment rates. This situation is only partly due
to the language and cultural barriers that hinder
cross-country movements; European workers
are also less likely to move within their own
countries in response to labor-market pressures.
This reluctance may reflect the relatively high
unemployment compensation in Europe.7
European governments recognize the need
for greater labor-market flexibility, but attempts
at labor-market reform are controversial. There
has been some progress, however. For example,
workers are now free to move across national
borders, and this movement can reduce the cost
of regional shocks. But it seems unlikely that
European labor markets will be able to meet
the demands for flexibility in the short run, fol-
lowing formation of the EMU.
The costs associated with losing independent
monetary and exchange-rate policy might be
small if there were either little evidence of re-
gional asymmetry or great evidence of labor-
market flexibility. In the European case, the op-
posite is true. In a well-known paper, Tamim
Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen find not only
that shocks are more symmetric across regions
in the United States but that labor markets in
the U.S. regions stabilize much more quickly
than labor markets in European countries.
These findings seem to suggest that Europe will
not form as successful a monetary union as that
in the United States, since regional losses may
be greater in Europe than the U.S. experience
would suggest, but that conclusion might be
premature.
Examination of labor-market flexibility com-
pares the abilities of the United States and Eu-
rope to adjust to economic shocks. But compar-
ing the shocks, as Bayoumi and Eichengreen
do in their paper, may not be appropriate be-
cause it involves comparing asymmetries
within an existing monetary union to those in
a potential one. After inauguration of the EMU,
sources of asymmetry will be reduced. For ex-
ample, the EMU will eliminate asymmetries in
setting monetary policy. Furthermore, countries 5See the article by Brian Cromwell.
6See, for example, the article by Tamim Bayoumi and
Barry Eichengreen. 7See the article by Jose Vinals and Juan Francisco Jimeno.
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that run fiscal deficits out of line with the Euro-
pean norm will be fined. In addition, the U.S.
federal income tax and welfare systems redis-
tribute income from expanding to contracting
regions; this leveling effect may make U.S. re-
gions appear more symmetric in their cyclical
movements than their European counterparts.
As similar tax and welfare policies take hold
within the European Union, redistributive poli-
cies may create more symmetry across regions
there as well.8
Although a single currency should lessen fis-
cal and monetary sources of asymmetry, there
are, at the same time, reasons to suspect that
adoption of a single currency may increase
asymmetry within the EMU. By reducing trans-
action costs, adopting a single currency may
increase trade. Trade tends to encourage re-
gional specialization in the production of goods.
If regions specialize in the types of goods they
produce, shocks to demand or to the produc-
tion of any particular good will affect regions
differently. If monetary union does increase
trade, regions within the common-currency
area may become less alike than they are now.
Ambiguity about the effect of monetary union
on the structure of the economy makes evalua-
tion of the potential costs and benefits of the
EMU highly speculative.9
Could Fiscal Policy Help? Faced with asym-
metric shocks, members of the EMU may have
to rely more heavily on fiscal policy to com-
pensate for the lack of independence in setting
monetary policy. The current trend in Europe,
however, leans toward the reduction of national
budgets.  As indicated earlier, taxation and re-
distribution across EMU countries may be a
promising approach. But the European Union’s
budget is currently much too small for such a
task; however, it may increase to meet the de-
mands of post-monetary-union Europe in the
next century.
How Do Countries in Europe Compare
with Each Other? At one time economists re-
ferred to Europe as consisting of a “core” and a
“periphery,” with the core represented by the
U.K., France, Germany, and perhaps Austria,
and the periphery by the Mediterranean coun-
tries.  Relatively large budget deficits and high
inflation rates distinguished  “peripheral”
countries, as did the fact that their business
cycles were rarely in sync with those in “core”
countries.
This breakdown is no longer as clear as it
once was, however. Budget deficits in Germany
and France have grown over the past eight or
nine years, while those in the once-peripheral
countries have fallen, as have their interest and
inflation rates. German re-unification repre-
sented a large asymmetric shock, relative to the
rest of Europe, from which Germany is still re-
covering.10  Nonetheless, Europe as a whole has
undergone a period of dramatic convergence
in interest and inflation rates and government
budget deficits since the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty on monetary union in 1993.
This convergence may indicate increasing sym-
metry and harmony in policy objectives as the
January 1, 1999, date for monetary union ap-
proaches.
SUMMARY
There are both costs and benefits associated
with forming any monetary union. The benefits
of monetary union stem from reducing trans-
action costs and eliminating exchange-rate un-
certainty. Falling transaction costs mean fewer
barriers to trade, which should increase com-
10See the article by Hans Werner-Sinn, which treats Ger-
man re-unification as an asymmetric shock within Europe.
8See the article by Barry Eichengreen for a discussion of
the anticipated role of tax and welfare policies across EMU
member countries.
9See the article by Maurice Obstfeld for a description of
the mechanics behind conversion to the single currency.Is the Fed Being Swept Out of (Monetary) Control? Jeffrey M. Wrase
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petition and reduce prices. Eliminating ex-
change-rate uncertainty will spur still more
trade; it may also lower interest rates, there-
fore making it cheaper to borrow to finance new
investment. In the European case, the benefits
may be greater still because if each country has
its own currency, speculative pressures
heighten the risk of costly exchange-rate move-
ments.
The costs depend on the extent to which
member countries would prefer to use indepen-
dent exchange-rate and monetary policies, on
the asymmetry of shocks to their economies,
and on how willing unemployed workers are
to move or accept wage cuts. Compared to the
United States, EMU countries are more likely
to experience regional shocks, and these shocks
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are less likely to meet with speedy labor-market
adjustment.
Whatever the costs of EMU,  mechanisms
other than domestic monetary or exchange-rate
policy will have to bear the burden of economic
adjustment after adoption of the single cur-
rency.  Barriers to movements of labor have
been removed, which encourages that adjust-
ment process. Further labor-market reforms
may be necessary to increase labor markets’
speed of adjustment. In addition, member coun-
tries may find it necessary to institute interna-
tional tax and redistribution policies through
growth of the European Union’s budget to al-
low for regional differences in policy stimulus
or restraint.